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Given the relatively small number of
academics doing serious analysis of the
PLAN, the introduction of a new point
of view is always to be welcomed. In
this case, however, naval professionals
interested in Chinese naval development
would be served better by going directly
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book
$33.99).

This book will be welcomed equally
by historians, political scientists, and
international relations specialists. It is
a worthy addition to existing literature
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated
to understanding modern China and
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an
associate professor in the Department
of Strategy at the Air War College, has
provided valuable additional information and analysis concerning the People’s
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was
planned deliberately and analytically,
then for nearly a month the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely
against China’s neighbor and former
ally. At the end of this period, the two
countries settled into a continuing active
and deadly border dispute that lasted
a decade. Taking advantage of recently
declassified Chinese documents and an
impressive number of interviews, Dr.
Zhang has advanced significantly our
understanding of why the Chinese chose
to initiate the somewhat Orwelliansounding “counterattack in self-defense
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against Vietnam,” how the war was
conducted, and why the subsequent
conflict along the VietnameseChinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds,
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and
more the central figure and key Chinese
decision maker. By the conclusion of the
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing
case that the war of 1979 was indeed
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered
as much to preserve and promote his
plans for economic modernization as to
affect the balance of power in the international political system, while simultaneously aiming to rehabilitate and start
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North
Vietnamese victory over the Americans
and the South Vietnamese had a surprisingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s
previously amiable and long-term alliance with China. Flushed with victory
and boasting a hardened and wellequipped army, the Vietnamese became,
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia and its deepening friendship
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see
China’s position as potentially imperiled,
threatened by the USSR to the north
and the Vietnamese to the south. In
particular, the invasion of Cambodia
in December 1978 was viewed as proof
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that
economic and industrial modernization
was the way ahead for China, arrived
at an apparently counterintuitive
conclusion. Significant combat operations conducted against Vietnam, the
Soviet Union’s most important regional
ally, would signal to the United States
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and other Western powers that China
was a reliable partner that could be
counted on to do what was needed.
In return, the West would be more
likely to continue to support Chinese
efforts to modernize, and the perceived
Soviet threat would be reduced.
However, as Zhang explains, the
Chinese army had not fought a major
war in three decades. Its tactics were
outdated and its logistics support was
inferior, and no officer below the rank
of battalion commander was battle
tested. Furthermore, the PLA did not
enjoy a positive reputation within
China’s general population. In contrast,
the Vietnamese army had decades of
recent combat experience, large stores
of modern Soviet and captured U.S.
military equipment, and the intangible
benefits that come with victory.
A massive propaganda campaign to
improve the image of the PLA was
launched. Significant amounts of
military stores were moved into the
Guangzhou and Kunming military
districts. Army planners prepared for
a massive offensive designed to seize
several major northern Vietnamese cities and wreck two Vietnamese divisions
in the process. The whole campaign was
designed to “teach Vietnam a lesson.”
Zhang provides a detailed account of
the fighting that followed. The Chinese
executed their plan successfully, albeit
at a much higher cost than anticipated.
Zhang debunks common claims by
Vietnamese that the majority of their
combatants were local militia fighters. While it is true that several elite
Vietnamese divisions were engaged in
Cambodia, far more regular army units
fought in the north than the Vietnamese
indicated. The war was almost exclusively a ground war, although both the
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Vietnamese and Chinese air forces carried out many reconnaissance missions.
After nearly thirty days of fairly hard
fighting, Chinese forces withdrew to the
border, having achieved their geographic
objectives and inflicted significant casualties on enemy forces. The operation
had been calibrated skillfully to “punish”
Vietnam, without going so far as to bring
the Soviets into the fray. Deng then
directed the army to continue to fight
along the border until the Vietnamese
withdrew from Cambodia. It would take
a decade—and the visible decline of the
Soviet Union—but in the end
Vietnamese leaders acquiesced and
Deng got what he wanted. During this
period Vietnam’s economy suffered.
China’s southernmost provinces
also suffered, but the nation reaped
the benefits of modernization
and Western engagement.
Chinese military leaders deliberately
used the ensuing chronic border conflict
to “blood” much of their army and
local militias. The war also provided
new heroes to place in the public eye.
However, in one of the more poignant
portions of the book, Zhang describes
how China’s Vietnam experience
affected many of the participants in
much the same manner as it had their
earlier U.S. equivalents. Strategically, the
war also saw the Chinese army embrace
combined operations and a turn to modernization as a requirement for victory.
Zhang makes a convincing argument
that Deng Xiaoping calculatingly
used the Chinese military instrument
to achieve strategic, domestic, and
personal goals. His war was one of
deliberate choice. Potential Vietnamese
hegemonic ambitions were thwarted;
Vietnam would be forced to leave
Cambodia. China’s ties to the West
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were strengthened; Soviet influence
in the region was weakened.
China reaped other benefits, although
some were perhaps mixed. Vietnam
would—and still does—view China
with suspicion. Other countries in
the region now know that China did,
and could once again, wage offensive
war, if seen to be in the interest of the
state. The Chinese military, once so
abysmally behind technologically, has
transformed itself. Combined arms
operations, performed haltingly at
best in 1979, are now common.

Zhang frequently and conscientiously
reminds the reader that, although
knowledge of the Sino-Vietnamese
conflict has increased greatly, it is
important not to embrace any conclusions, even the most apparently
convincing, as definitive. This is because
some Chinese and all the Vietnamese
records have yet to be declassified. The
warning is appropriate, but should
not detract from Zhang’s analysis, nor
from a deep appreciation of his work.
RICHARD J. NORTON

OUR REVIEWERS
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